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Incentive Compensation
For Ministers?
Do religious
Designing pay-for-performance
plans in for-profit companies is
difficult enough. But, as I have
noted in these pages previously,
it can be even more difficult
in not-for-profit organizations
because the mission or bottom
line may be more difficult to
ar ticulate (see the May 2012
Research for the Real World
column, “Governance and Executive Compensation in Nonprofits”
and the April 2013 column, “Pay in Nonprofits”). But what
about religious organizations? Would such plans actually
work? Are there potential unintended consequences?
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Paying leaders of for-profit organizations is difficult. And this
is even the case when there is some agreement regarding
the objectives of the organizations (e.g., returns to shareholders in publicly held companies). But as we step away
from the most obvious objective of maximizing shareholder
return or profit, things can get more complicated.
What is the objective of a major league sports team? Is
it to maximize wins, or profit, or both? And if they take
their eye off the ball (or puck) of either, do they fail at
both? What about a not-for-profit nursing home? Does it, for
example, aim to extend residents’ lives, provide quality-oflife care, maximize the lifespan of the organization itself,
create “profit” to be put to other noble causes in the future,
or something else altogether? And once the objective is
determined, can compensation plans be structured to pay
for performance to this end? If the pay plan is designed to
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motivate and/or reward a leader of this nursing home to
fulfill the objective(s), are there unintended consequences?
In this regard, how can pay of religious leaders be considered, given these organizations may have a mission going
beyond maximization of profits. Surely, some will argue that
many leaders of religious organizations are called to do the
work they do and are likely giving up substantial amounts
of money in order to do that work (the same can be said of
leaders of all sorts of not-for-profits). But, leaving aside how
much religious leaders are paid, it is interesting to think
about how they are paid.

A Study of Religious Leaders
Three authors shed considerable light on this by using a
rich data set of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers over
43 years. To be sure, the data are from one specific religious
group in one region of the United States, but the data are
absolutely extraordinary. In “Is a Higher Calling Enough?
Incentive Compensation in the Church,” Journal of Labor
Economics, 28(3), 2010, 509-539, authors Jay C. Hartzell,
Christopher A. Parsons and David L. Yermack consider
pay and productivity with this unique dataset. I will only
mention a few of their interesting findings.
The data include information on 727 United Methodist
Churches in the Midwest (2,201 unique ministers) for each
year from 1961-2003, data on minister salary, congregation membership, attendance, revenue, members added
and multiple reasons for members added (e.g., from other
Methodist churches, from other Christian churches and new
conversions to Christianity).
The authors are fundamentally interested in whether
there is pay for performance for ministers in the data.
They recognize that this is potentially an unusual place to
find evidence of such incentives because folks are likely
intrinsically “called” to be ministers, and pay may not be
an immediate factor in accepting this kind of recruitment
call. They also recognize that having incentive contracts
for religious leaders might hamper credibility among the
parishioners. They do not seek to see whether there is, for
example, language in minister contracts that links pay and
performance. Rather, they explore the data in an attempt
to find relationships that may be consistent with pay for
performance, regardless of whether such incentives are
purposely devised.
One finding of this study: Just as in many other forms of
executive compensation, there is a strong link between pay
and organization size for this group of ministers. Controlling for other factors, the authors found that when a new

member joins a church, the minister, on average, would see
annual pay go up about $15. And when a member leaves,
an average minister’s annual pay goes down about $7. Seen
another way, the authors document that, controlling for
other factors, “a pastor is paid close to 3 percent of the
incremental revenue that accrues to the church when a new
member joins” (p. 511).
Economists like to calculate “elasticities.” An elasticity
is the percentage increase in one thing that happens in
response to a 1 percent increase in another. Here, the
authors calculate and present the “elasticity of pay with
respect to organization size.” They find that as the size of a
church increases by 1 percent, on average the minister’s pay
would increase about one-fifth of 1 percent, or an elasticity
of about 0.2. In other words, doubling the congregation size
correlates with a 20 percent increase in the average annual
salary. The equivalent number for for-profit CEOs in the
United States is between 0.3 and 0.4 (p. 525).
They go on to consider many other issues, such as
whether the return for “poaching” members from neighboring congregations of their own faith is lower than for
recruiting converts from other faiths (it is) and whether
ministers are compensated for risk. With respect to the
latter, they find lower pay-for-performance sensitivity in
parishes where church revenue is highly volatile, such as
some regions of Oklahoma where church revenue fluctuates with oil prices.

Paying Religious Leaders and
Leaders of For-Profits
It is striking that the lessons learned from even a specific
set of leaders in one specific religious group has lessons
that could be applied to the compensation on leaders in
all sorts of workplaces. Pay, performance, risk, incentives,
organization structure and compensation are linked in a
dizzying array within most organizations. I expect I’ll be
thinking about this the next time I happen to be listening
to a Sunday-morning sermon.
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